During the 415 – 413 BC Athenian invasion of Sicily, a Syracusan aristocrat named Hermocrates had become the hero of the day, by uniting all the Sicilian Greeks against the Athenians. He was then sent as a naval commander to the Peloponnese to help the Spartans out against the Athenians there. But victory in this theatre of war was elusive, and Diocles, Hermocrates’ political opponent, used Hermocrates’ defeats as an excuse to get the Syracusan citizens’ assembly to have him exiled. They duly did this and voted a new corps to take the place of Hermocrates and his officers. Not only was Hermocrates forcibly retired, but he also could not even come home. So, with some Persian help, he rented five triremes and hired a thousand mercenaries and set sail for Sicily.
He arrived at Messina just as Hannibal was razing Himera to the ground. He took into his army a thousand of the refugees flowing out of Himera, bringing his ranks up to a total of two thousand soldiers. He then, through his friends inside Syracuse, tried to coax the assembly to have his exile revoked, but Diocles was able to convince them otherwise.
Hermocrates, then, took over Selinus, since it had no Punic garrison to protect it. He raised a call to all displaced Selinuntines to join him and his army. Together, they were going to avenge their defeat against Carthage. As a result, Hermocrates saw his ranks swell to six thousand men.
Hermocrates and his men then attacked the territories of Motya and Panormus and defeated any resistance they gave. The point of this was to rile up the Syracusans with patriotic fervour. Hermocrates had hoped that such patriotism would then lead to his recall since he was the only one that seemed to have any guts to fight the Carthaginians. But he failed to move anybody at Syracuse, enough to want him back.
Needless to say, this provoked Carthage. If Syracuse couldn’t control her own son, then Carthage would have to take measures to protect the Epikrateia herself and drive the renegades out of Selinus. Not only that, if Selinus somehow became independent again, then Carthage’s allies in the surrounding area were in danger. Carthage had to act.
Since nothing had worked so far, Hermocrates made his next move. He marched to Himera, where he collected the bones of dead Syracusan soldiers that had fallen here in their fight against Hannibal. He then had these bones delivered to Syracuse in the hopes of causing Diocles grief, since it was he who had left his dead unburied, a notably dishonourable act. Though this got Diocles banished, it didn’t get Hermocrates recalled.
When this PR stunt failed, Hermocrates then decided to launch a coup. He marched to Syracuse one night, where his friends opened the entrance to the city for him. But since his army was trailing, he decided to wait for them outside. While he stood at the gate, the sleepy Syracusans began to clue into what was happening and organized a defence. By the time Hermocrates was able to enter the city, the Syracusans were ready. In the clash that followed, Hermocrates was killed. The next morning, his supporters were tried, found guilty and executed.
Hermocrates would surely have known what he was doing and what the geopolitical ramifications of these raids were. By triggering Carthage, he was endangering Sicilian freedom and Syracusan ambitions on the island as well as ensuring the permanent loss of Selinus. There was also the danger that Acragas might join Carthage in any new war simply because Acragas enjoyed a lucrative trade with Carthage and was a rival with Syracuse for hegemony over Sicily. Except for Himera in 480 BC, every time Carthage allied with a city on the island, she won. In Hermocrates’ mind, by putting Syracuse in a difficult spot, he was trying to force his government’s hand. With Carthage provoked and with the possibility that Acragas might ally with her, Hermocrates knew that the Carthaginians needed to be driven out. And to drive them out, he knew, a pan-Siceliot alliance was needed. And though Carthage had now been provoked, Hermocrates’ raids also showed that her hold in the west of the island was quite vulnerable, and with the right configuration of alliances, Carthage could be driven out. What was missing was a leader who could unite everyone and lead them to victory; a true hegemon of Sicily. In Hermocrates’ mind, that true hegemon was himself. And so, by provoking Carthage, Hermocrates also hoped that he could endear himself to the people at Syracuse who would demand his return and hand him the reins.
Whatever form the Punic response to Hermocrates’ shenanigans ought to have taken, everyone expected it to be measured. There were reasons to suppose that the Punic assembly was satisfied with the status quo that Hannibal’s 409 BC campaign had established. The Greeks were effectively excluded from the Southern Mediterranean. The nearest free Greek city to the Epikrateia, Acragas, was 20 miles away. The closest after that, Gela, was 30 miles beyond that. There was a significant gap between Solus and Cephaloedium. It was, perhaps, as a result of Hermocrates’ raids that the Carthaginians occupied this gap by founding a settlement just east of Himera, called Thermae Himerae, as I had mentioned in the previous episode. The empire was now secure. There was no need to add new territory. Any further conquests meant that the new subject cities would require mercenaries to garrison them, which would be a drain on the financial resources of Carthage. It was much more cost effective to maintain friendly relations with the Greeks. But, interestingly enough, as we’ll soon see, none of that mattered. As Diodorus claims quite truthfully, the Carthaginians used this episode as an excuse to embark upon the conquest of Sicily.
Before I begin today’s episode, I’d like to mention that more folks have given me five-star iTunes reviews. To them, I say, please accept my sincere thanks. Your appreciation gives me the encouragement to work harder and produce more material. So, ladies and gentlemen, please give Historyteller an honest rating and a review on iTunes. It keeps me focused and helps others discover the podcast.
I had also mentioned in the last episode that I wanted the direction of this podcast to be determined by my listeners. To that end, I had asked two questions. The first was: How long (that is, how many episodes) would you like me to make the Punic Wars, which aren’t that far off from the current point in the narrative? And the second: After I’m done with Punic history, what other history would you like me to work on? I’m collecting answers to these questions, through a survey. I’ll include a link to that in the show notes for this episode. I’m going to close the survey on October the thirty-first. Until then, I’ll keep reminding you to respond in every episode.
I now have a Patreon account, too. So, if you’re inclined to help support the podcast, a one-dollar-a-month pledge can go a long way. Patreon can also allow for special content only for those patrons who contribute at or beyond a certain dollar-threshold. The one-dollar-a-month tier is for those who’d like to keep the free feed going. As of the last episode, I didn’t have a tier for those who would like to contribute more in return for extra content. Now, however, after having researched the material for this and the next episode thoroughly, there is enough supplementary material, that I can offer extra content. What you heard before the title music was a very condensed version of the story of Hermocrates. While that piece was intended for today’s episode, I realized that I could flesh the story out a bit more and offer it to Patrons who contribute five dollars a month to my Patreon account. Today’s episode will, very briefly, mention the great Syracusan tyrant Dionysius the Elder. Doing a complete history of this guy would detract from Punic history. So I won’t tackle it directly on the main feed. However, I am going to turn just the story of Dionysius into a mini-series that I am going to put on the five-dollar-a-month tier on Patreon. This is a smashing story and you won’t want to miss this.
Finally, at the end of the last episode I mentioned that this episode was going to be called “Enter Dionysius.” At the time I wrote that episode, I thought that the events I mention today and those that I will mention in the next one could be covered in one episode. That is not the case, so I have split the history of this new war into two episodes. Even though today’s episode has Dionysius in the title, Dionysius will not feature in it, except for a brief mention. Dionysius will get a fairer hearing in the next episode. And if you really want to delve into his life, I suggest becoming a Patron of Historyteller on Patreon.
With that, let’s go crack some eggs.
In the last episode we covered the return of the Magonid family on to the international geopolitical scene with a smashing military success in Sicily. Hannibal Mago had conquered Selinus and Himera within the space of a single campaigning season. When he left Sicily, he had not concluded a peace with anyone. Technically, a state of war between Syracuse and Carthage still existed, since Syracuse had violated her neutrality by supplying troops to Himera. Despite that, an uneasy truce existed between the two sides. Unfortunately for Syracuse, Hermocrates upset that delicate balance.
Though the Spartans had won against the Athenian Navy with Syracusan help in 409 BC, Carthage had no reason to be threatened by the Syracusans. They hadn’t exactly distinguished themselves at Himera. Not to mention, with the Hermocrates episode, the deep divisions within and between Siceliot and Syracusan societies had been exposed. In the 409 BC campaign, the distrust the allies showed each other was very obvious. And now, Hermocrates’ attempt at a coup would almost guarantee that any resistance the Syracusans showed the Carthaginians would be split right down the middle. And this, of course, will play right into Carthage’s hands. Time was ripe for Carthage to launch a new war.
As was the case with Himera in 480 BC, Carthage took her own sweet time in preparing a response. And as always, she didn’t want to jump the gun before covering her bases. A few decades ago, a partial inscription was discovered at Athens. This inscription revealed that in 406 BC Carthage had sent Athens an envoy to coax her into becoming a Punic ally. The Athenians received the Carthaginians warmly and invited them to participate in some entertainment, presumably a play. Though the inscription does not tell us what Carthage’s terms were, it is not unreasonable to assume that these were the same as those that Athens offered back in 413 BC, which Carthage had rejected at the time. The Athenian representatives indicated their inclination to accept the Punic terms, whatever they were if their citizens’ assembly were to ratify it. The inscription does not mention if it did. What it says is that a few Athenian generals made it to Sicily and joined up with the Carthaginian brass to “assess the situation.” What this means, the inscription does not make clear.
What this treaty, if there ever was one, was supposed to achieve is not known either. Athens had been fighting Sparta, and by this time in the war, she had been stretched to her limits. Things had turned so sour that even the 409 BC withdrawal of the Syracusan Navy from the war meant nothing. The Spartans had Persian help, now, so that they could use the war to exclude Athens from Asia Minor and the Aegean, giving Sparta the upper hand. Soon, Sparta would dictate terms to Athens. And, as if to rub salt in her wound, Alcibiades, the star Athenian general of the war had been exiled, and Athens was on the brink of a civil war. Had the Athenian terms been accepted back in 413 BC, we might have seen a different outcome, not just for Hannibal and the Carthaginians, but even for the Athenians and the Spartans.
While the effects of this alliance aren’t evident, it’s fun to speculate what would have happened had this alliance not been in place (again, that is, if it ever was in place). Though at the moment, Athens was quite weak, she may have hoped that with this alliance the Syracusan Navy, pulled out for the previous engagement with the Carthaginians, would stay in Sicily, thus, weakening Sparta. Lack of Syracusan support for Sparta meant that the Athens could give the Spartans a tough time. That, in turn, would ensure that the Carthaginians could prosecute their war without any hindrance from Sparta. What the Carthaginians did not want at this time was for Athens to capitulate, allowing Sparta and Corinth to come to Syracuse’s aid.
A weak side effect of the alliance may have been that the Greek Sicilian cities of Naxos and Catane, being of Ionic Greek stock, the same as that of Athens, did not send any troops to join Syracuse in the coming war, perhaps out of deference to their Ionic kin.
The Carthaginians also sent embassies to Iberia and the Balearic Islands to gather mercenaries, while they imposed a levy on their Libyan, Numidian and Mauretanian subjects and allies. They were able to gather 300,000 men, according to Ephorus, while Timaeus puts that number at 120,000. The number of the fleet ranges from 90 to 120 triremes, depending on who you read, while Diodorus adds a 1000 transport ships to that number. Except for the triremes, whose range of 90 to 120 seems realistic, the 120,000 and 300,000 numbers for the infantrymen are most certainly an exaggeration. Modern estimates range from 30,000 to 60,000 men. Diodorus’ 1,000 number for the transports seems to be estimated based on the 120,000 figure for the infantry, so it’s quite safe to assume that that number is also an exaggeration.
Reports of Carthage’s diplomatic efforts reached Syracuse, and, in response, she sent an embassy to Carthage, protesting, that they had nothing to do with Hermocrates. He was a renegade, and the good news was that he had been adequately disposed of. Such pleas only fell on deaf ears, however. Carthage had chosen the warpath, and there was no going back.
The Carthaginian Senate appointed Hannibal again as the war leader, but this time, owing to his advanced age, they also gave him a younger relative, Himilco, the son of Hanno the Navigator, as an assistant. His job was to share his duties with Hannibal and, presumably, to succeed him should the grim reaper call to harvest Hannibal’s soul.
In the April of 406 BC, Hannibal sent an advanced guard of 40 triremes. Syracuse, now on her guard after her failed embassy to Carthage, had sent out a naval guard of her own to the West of Sicily to intercept any Punic warships. When the Punic maritime vanguard arrived, the Syracusans attacked. Fifteen Punic ships sank, and the rest escaped to the Aegates Islands, West of Sicily.
When word of the Syracusan attack reached Hannibal, he quickly set out with the bulk of his army. On the way, he was joined by the remainder of his advance guard. Not encountering any Syracusans this time, Hannibal landed somewhere in Western Sicily, though the sources do not specify the exact location. He left 40 ships in Motya and Panormus and sent the rest home, the literature not clarifying how many ships each city got.
Though no source mentions this, it is not unreasonable to assume that, if any of Hermocrates’ men were still in Selinus, Hannibal must have cleaned them out before doing anything else first. Since there are no reports of any fighting in Selinus, it is safe to assume that even if Selinus was occupied and even if Hannibal sent men there to clean it out, the occupants just packed up and left upon the arrival of Hannibal’s men.
Because Hannibal was going to direct his wrath against Syracuse, a city on the Eastern edge of the island, he wanted to make sure that the rear of his army was safe from attack. This meant ensuring that the Greek city of Acragas would not be a threat.
Acragas was the nearest city to Selinus and a few miles inland from the Southern coast. She became exceedingly prosperous by carefully navigating her neutrality in the various wars of the previous decades. She had a reputation for wealth and luxury, notable public buildings, especially temples, and a taste for fine Greek art.
As it so happens, she was also one of Carthage’s trading partners, supplying her with olives. In Hermocrates’ calculations, she ought to have been a Carthaginian ally. Not only was her olive trade with the Punic city one of the sources of her wealth, but she was also in competition with Syracuse for hegemony over the island. Both reasons ought to have made her a natural friend of the Carthaginians. But she was Greek, and Doric to boot. Would she opt to fight her ethnic brethren?
Hannibal offered her two options; a formal alliance against Syracuse, or neutrality. She could join Carthage, under whose aegis she could be the rising star of Sicily after Syracuse’s fall, or she could elect to stay safe, and not engage in any hostilities. No pressure.
Unexpectedly, however, Acragas chose war. She rebuffed Hannibal’s, quite reasonable, offer, harvested her crops, moved everyone outside the walls, inside and began the dreadful wait. Allying with barbarians against their fellow Greeks was unthinkable for them. Perhaps Hannibal’s treatment of the Himerans in 409 BC made them think long and hard about what the Carthaginians could do. In their minds, no Greek was safe under the Carthaginians.
The Acragantines had founded their settlement upon some hills, while to Acragas’ west ran the river Hypsas. The hills and the river gave Acragas an excellent defensive position, supplemented by fortifications, making the city almost impregnable. The Western side, thus covered, left the Eastern side which, though secure, was open to aid from the Eastern cities. Taking both these facts into account, Hannibal split his army into two. The primary division he placed in a fortified camp on a plain in the South West of the city. This division retained all the engines that Hannibal wanted to use to conduct his siege. He then placed a detachment consisting of Iberians and Libyans on the Eastern side, so that they could intercept any help that came from that direction.
Acragas had taken into service, Dexippus, a Spartan soldier of fortune, who had served under Hermocrates. He brought 1500 mercenaries from Gela who were joined by the 800 Oscan mercenaries who had previously fought for Hannibal. They had decided to work for the Greeks now since they were unhappy with their share of the loot from the last war. Dexippus and his mercenaries were stationed on the Hill of Athena in the North East of the city. Despite being close to Hannibal’s Eastern division, neither side offered battle and held on to their positions. The main Acragantine army was inside the walls, waiting for a breach occur so that they could either quickly repair it, or fight the oncoming Carthaginians.
After dividing his force, Hannibal began a vigorous assault on the walls of the city, which the Acragantines vigorously defended. Every day the Carthaginians managed to make a breach and every night the Acragantines were able to repair it. On one particular night, a couple of Acrangintes managed to sneak outside their walls and set the two Punic siege towers on fire.
And as if the loss of the two towers wasn’t enough, the Hypsas river was also proving to be a formidable obstacle for the besiegers. So Hannibal ordered that the tombs of long-dead Acragantines that lay outside the city be destroyed and their stones used to fill the bed of the Hypsas river. One of the graves they dared to desecrate was that of Theron, the tyrant whose acquisition of Himera in 483 BC became the trigger for Hamilcar’s humiliating defeat more than 70 years earlier. During its desecration, lightning struck the tomb. This scared the shit out of the Carthaginians. Priests began to foretell of damned portents, while soldiers reported seeing Theron’s ghost at night crying out for vengeance against those who dared defile his final resting place. And then, almost as if the gods themselves sought revenge on Theron’s behalf, a plague struck the Carthaginian camp. One of the first ones it carried off was Hannibal himself. A fitting end for a man wanted to awaken the dead.
With Hannibal’s demise, Himilco, Hannibal’s younger assistant, now took the reins of the Punic field command. He didn’t become a basileus, though, because Diodorus tells us that that didn’t happen until 396 BC, an issue we’ll discuss later. As soon as he did so, he ordered that the destruction of the tombs be stopped. He then sacrificed a male child to Baal Hammon as atonement for the sins of his predecessor and proceeded to drown a few unfortunate animals in the sea, presumably to appease Poseidon. These were not the child immolation sacrifices since those were meant to protect against utter destruction, which was not the case here. These were purification rituals to cleanse the Punic host of their collective sins, especially the sin of the desecration of the Greek tombs. After the purification rituals were complete, Himilco proceeded to assault the walls of Acragas once again, just as his predecessor had done.
After Syracuse’s protest embassy had failed to coax the Carthaginians into abandoning their imperial ambitions, she had sent embassies all around Sicily and Italy to convince the Greek populations there to join their efforts against the oncoming Punic onslaught. Many rallied to this call, and gathered at Messina, from whence they marched to Acragas, taking the coastal road. On the way, they marched through Gela and Camarina and collected more troops. Diodorus tells us that in all, there were 30,000 hoplites and 5,000 horsemen, while 30 triremes covered their seaward flank. This cohort was commanded by the elected Syracusan general, Daphnaeus whose adjutant was none other than our friend, Dionysius. Brian Caven, a British classicist, suggests that Diodorus’ 30,000 figure is smaller than what actually may have been the case. He makes the argument that apart from the hoplites, there may also have been light infantry accompanying the Greek cohort, as they always did. The numbers of the hoplites may have been the official number gleaned from the records, since these soldiers, though middle class, belonged to the propertied classes. The lighter infantry did not belong to the propertied classes, and hence, was not as well documented. In Caven’s estimation, the grand total was probably closer to 60,000 men.
Upon their arrival, Himilco commanded his Eastern division to descend into the plains facing the city and prevent them from entering Acragas. The two sides were probably evenly matched. And given the result of the engagement, there might have been slightly more Greeks than Carthaginians, with the heavy-armoured hoplites outnumbering their heavy-armoured Punic counterparts. Details of the battle do not survive, but Diodorus tells us that the Carthaginians were routed and lost 6,000 men in the melee.
The Carthaginians withdrew and marched back to join their main camp. Daphnaeus could have given them chase, but didn’t. He recalled Hannibal’s feigned retreat from Himera in the last war, and how that ended up in a disaster. As the Eastern Punic division marched along the Southern wall of Acragas, the Acragantines were observing them go by. With the enemy so close, the Acragantine soldiery was keen on ambushing them. But the generals wouldn’t have it, on the same grounds as Daphnaeus.
Daphnaeus now occupied the Hill of Athena alongside Dexippus and his men. The Acragantines, too, poured out of the gates to join them, clearly agitated by the inaction of their leaders. Rumours spread in the camp that the generals were taking bribes from the Carthaginians. Clearly, someone was exploiting already existing class tensions among the Acragantines, since their soldiery was composed of commoners, while the generals were elected from amongst the aristocracy. With everyone now gathered, an impromptu assembly was now held to discuss the situation.
Brian Caven claims that such rumours gained currency because hoplites were taught to believe that wars ought to be settled quickly via pitched battles. In the face of what could appear to be a clear-cut victory, a general’s inaction was considered cowardice. A Hannibal Barca, the famous Carthaginian general of the Second Punic War, or one of the Scipione, Roman generals who fought Carthage, with professional soldiers at their disposal, could have pulled off an attack in the flank of the withdrawing Punic division, and pulled back quickly enough to avoid being attacked himself. A citizen militia, however, trying to do the same would not have been victorious. They could not have withdrawn quickly enough to avoid Himilco attacking their flank. Daphnaeus was at least a mile away, so by the time he would reach to help, the deed would have been done. At the root of this belief was the genuine concern that the soldiery were ordinary citizen-farmers. While they were at war, their farms were unattended. The quicker they end the war, the sooner they could get home and tend to their farms.
Based on the rumours now spreading like wildfire in the camp, the Acragantine generals were tried in the assembly, and were sentenced to… Drum roll please… Death by stoning. Four out of the five Acragantine generals thus met a grisly end. Dexippus was spared, perhaps because of his association with Sparta or probably because he didn’t really get a chance to engage the Carthaginians. In their stead, a new cohort of generals was elected to continue with Acragas’ defence.
Daphnaeus now moved in closer to the Punic camp. He couldn’t assault it directly since it was heavily fortified. The only thing he could do was to put Hannibal’s cohort under a blockade, preventing the Carthaginians from bringing in any supplies. This was an excellent strategy. It would ensure that hunger would set in at the Punic camp. With the plague already having struck once, the summer and the swampy conditions around the river would make sure that another bout was just around the corner. Of course, hunger and disease would result in death, but they could also prompt the healthier contingents to either mutiny their general or switch sides. And Daphnaeus, though he was being supplied by Gela, didn’t need to hold out too long either. How long does it take to kill a man through starvation, especially when the plague is looming?
Himilco would have been at his wit’s end trying to figure out what to do. But this time, he was in luck. The counter-siege would have resulted in its intended consequences had it not been for a piece of news that reached Himilco’s ear. He learnt that a convoy of grain had left from Gela for Acragas. He was able to immediately dispatch heralds to Motya and Panormus to send in the forty triremes that had remained there, with instructions to intercept the Gelan grain convoy. The convoy was inadequately protected since the Syracusans were not expecting an attack. The Punic fleet had, thus far, been inactive. And winter was approaching, so it wasn’t likely to become active any time soon. This was a gross miscalculation. The Punic fleet sunk eight of Syracuse’s triremes, while the rest were driven aground. All the grain transports were captured.
This might not have been so bad if the only effect of this attack was the seizing of the grain. In that case, the Carthaginians and Greeks would have been evenly poised from a supply point of view. And that would mean that Daphnaeus would have to extend his siege a little longer. In any case, winter would come, and Himilco would have to go home. However, such was not the case. Acragas had eaten her way through her supplies. Gela could supply only so much before running out herself. The position was now reversed. Just as the besiegers had become the besieged, those causing the starvation were now the ones being starved.
The non-Greek mercenaries in the Greek camp were now getting edgy. Sensing this agitation, Himilco bribed the 800 Oscans with 15 talents of silver to switch sides. Being experienced military men, they could see which way the wind was blowing and jumped ship. The tide was clearly turning.
After the Oscans deserted, the Italian Greeks withdrew, too. With winter now approaching, crossing the straits to get to Italy would be impossible if they hadn’t moved earlier. Though, a rumour ran rampant that Dexippus had bribed the Italians to go home. With the status quo now having been upended, Daphnaeus too decided to withdraw. Supplies were low, and it was better to live to fight another day. If a siege had to be conducted, then it better be undertaken when conditions were favourable. Greek supplies ought to last long enough for the Carthaginians to abandon their siege and go home. And lo and behold, the soldiery accused Daphnaeus of succumbing to bribery, too. Seriously! When will these guys stop? Spoiler alert, they won’t, to their own detriment.
Because Acragas could be defended no longer, the top brass decided to evacuate her. On a cold night in the middle of December, everyone left the town. The old, the infirm and the sick were left behind. Daphnaeus, as a precaution, had some soldiers light torches on the walls to give the Carthaginians the impression that nothing was happening.
At daybreak the next morning, after seven months of besieging and being besieged, Himilco entered the abandoned city. Those left behind were killed since they were of no value as slaves. The army plundered the houses and the temples, which seemed to have lived up to their reputation as bastions of luxury. The choicest paintings and sculptures, Himilco kept for himself. This included the legendary brazen bull of Acragas’ long-dead tyrant, Phalaris, in which he used to roast his victims, alive. With all this loot, Himilco ordered his ships to go back to Carthage. He and his men then settled at Acragas to enjoy a comfortable winter.
Under military protection, Acragantine refugees arrived at Gela. Though Dexippus stayed here (his remaining mercenaries were Gelan, after all), the refugees went further on to Leontini. Some settled here for the time being, while others decided to make Syracuse their temporary home. Many sent their families and movable possessions further on to Italy. Everyone was in a state of fear. Everyone knew that Gela and Camarina were next.
Next time, we will see how Himilco continues the war, and how the Sicilians, this time under Dionysius, will defend themselves. Join me in the next episode, “Episode 1.13 – Enter Dionysius Part II – The Battle of Gela.”
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- Warmington, B. H. Carthage. London: Roberta Hale & Company, 1969 (Buy from Amazon, also here & here)
- Miles, Richard. Carthage Must Be Destroyed. London: Penguin Books, 2010 (Buy from Amazon, Buy audiobook from Audible)
- Picard, Gilbert-Charles and Collette Picard. The Life and Death of Carthage. Translated by Dominique Collon. New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1968 (Buy from Amazon, also here)