In the last episode, we began looking at Carthage’s interactions with other civilizations active in the Mediterranean during the sixth century BC. We looked at her interactions with the Greeks, the Etruscans and the, as of yet nascent, Romans. The last episode was a patchwork of different events that took us from the 540s BC to the end of the sixth century.
I also commented in the last episode about the patchiness of the history of Carthage from about 580 BC until 410 BC. To add to this patchiness, even when the Greeks fight the Carthaginians virtually no details remain. We saw that last time in the case of the Battle of Alalia and the war against Dorieus and his colonists. No details are given for either battle. We are to content ourselves with their result. In today’s episode, however, we will discuss one event that does not fit this pattern. We will be examining the first battle in Punic history that the Greeks recorded in considerable detail.
So, without further ado, let’s join the party.
Before we get to today’s main event, we need to begin our discussion with a little digression into late sixth-century Sicilian politics, to set the context.
As Hellas (which is the Greek name for, well, Greece) transitioned from her Archaic age to the classical era, her cities saw themselves change from oligarchies to dictatorships to democracies. According to B. H. Warmington, a British classicist, these changes were the result of the Greeks’ interaction with other cultures, particularly, Egypt and Persia. These changes were also relatively peaceful. As Aristotle points out, the Greek cities did not suffer much violence because their political dissidents left the mother cities and found greener pastures elsewhere in the Mediterranean. Thus, this migration out of Mother Hellas released some of the political pressure and diffused it abroad.
Sicily, however, was still quite a backwater, at the end of the 6th century. Her inhabitants did not interact with cultures outside the ones found in Sicily and had no desire to leave the island to colonize places outside her, either. They did form colonies, but not beyond the shores of Sicily herself. For these reasons, at least according to Warmington, the Siceliot colonies remained oligarchic. However, this also meant that if any revolutions were to happen here, Sicily would become a political pressure cooker. Without an extensive colonial culture, the Siceliots didn’t have the mechanisms that allowed them to relieve any internal political pressures. In other words, despite the semblance of stability, Sicily was a ticking time bomb.
When Xerxes rumbled into Anatolia, Greek refugees came pouring into Sicily, bringing with them ideas that they had acquired from other civilizations. With new ideas came political trouble. One thing led to another and Sicily became a hotbed of revolution, with one faction vying for power over another. The resulting political instability brought opportunities for men who sought absolute power. The Greeks called them tyrants. These were men who came to power through violent or unconstitutional means, as opposed to the dictators on mainland Greece, who acquired authority through political or legal maneuvering. As a result of the rise of these tyrants, the beginning of the fifth century BC saw Sicily divided into three separate power blocs.
In 498, a man named Hippocrates became Gela’s first tyrant, and another man named Gelon served under him, helping him conquer many of Sicily’s Greek colonies. In 491 BC, Gelon himself became tyrant of Gela. Gelon was one of the officers that fought on behalf of Dorieus when the Carthaginians intervened in the conflict between Selinus and Segesta, a fact that I alluded to at the very end of the last episode.
As a result of that war, Gelon hated the Carthaginians. As soon as he enthroned himself at Gela, the sources tell us, he initiated a war to avenge the death of Dorieus. No details are given. Presumably, Gelon attacked the Punic cities on Sicily and the Carthaginians retaliated. The only thing the sources mention is that the Carthaginians destroyed the city of Heraclea Minoa. Gelon also made plans to “liberate the Gulf of Gabes,” which is the gulf just south of the Cap Bon peninsula on the coast of North Africa. What this liberation meant, the sources do not tell us. To help him in this war, Gelon sent embassies to various Greek cities but was spurned by all of them. His plan to “liberates the Gulf of Gabes,” thus, came to nothing. As much as he hated the Carthaginians, the denial of his requests for help did not endear him to the mainland Greeks either.
Gelon had already inherited a sizable chunk of Sicily from Hippocrates. After the war with Carthage, Gelon expanded his territories to include much of Southern and Eastern Sicily. His eyes were set, however, on Syracuse. Syracuse was under the thumb of landed aristocrats, referred to in the sources as the Gamoroi. Curiously, they were also allied to Carthage. But the Gamoroi aristocracy was overthrown in a popular revolt, and Syracusans chose democracy in its place. As a result, in 485 BC, the Gamoroi invited Gelon to intervene. He was happy to oblige. However, instead of relieving the city and leaving her for the Syracusans to squabble over, Gelon took her for himself. Seeing that Syracuse could be his leading city, with her magnificent harbor and easy access to the mainland, he made Syracuse his capital. He also attacked Camarina, Sicilian Euboea, and Sicilian Megara successfully, and forced their populations to relocate to Syracuse. In 483 BC, perhaps, as a preventative measure, Gelon sought and acquired the alliance of Theron, the tyrant of the southern Sicilian city of Acragas, which he would need if he wanted the Carthaginians out of Sicily. Thus, by 483 BC, almost the entire south and east of Sicily was under the collective thumbs of Gelon and Theron and thus formed the first Sicilian power bloc.
In the northeastern corner of Sicily, was the city of Zancle. Across the straits, right on the tip of the toe of Italy was Rhegium. A man named Anaxilas became tyrant of Rhegium in 493. Since then, he also had his eyes on Zancle. If Zancle was in his hands, he could control the straits, and, hence, any movements through it. When the Zanclians found themselves in a spot of trouble with the locals, Anaxilas saw his opportunity and seized the city. He then expelled her inhabitants and populated it with Messinians escaping Spartan oppression on mainland Greece. Being inhabited by Messinians now, Anaxilas creatively renamed Zancle to Messina. Sicilian Messina, thus, became a launching pad for Anaxilas’ take over of some of Sicily’s northern colonies.
Anaxilas watched with alarm as the Doric allies, Gelon and Theron, brought South Eastern Sicily under their control. To provide a counterweight to their alliance, he sought the alliance of Terrilos, the tyrant of the city of Himera. To seal the deal, Terrilos gave his daughter in marriage to Anaxilas. Thus, the northern coast of Sicily came under Terrilos’ and Anaxilas’ collective control, thus forming the second power bloc on Sicily.
For a variety of different reasons, the aristocracy at Himera did not like Terrilos. They invited Theron to depose him, which he did. But just like all political opportunists, instead of handing her over to Himera’s aristocrats, he took Himera for himself. Terrilos escaped to Rhegium, where he sought the aid of his son-in-law, Anaxilas.
Anaxilas, for his part, saw it fit to request the help of the third power bloc, that of Carthage. By now, the Phoenician colonies of Motya, Panormus & Solus were under Punic control. Collectively, the Greek sources refer to this set of settlements as the Epikrateia. In the summer of 483 BC, he sent a delegation to Carthage, requesting military aid to help him reinstate Terrilos as the despot at Himera in exchange for loyalty and overlordship. As a guarantee of his good behavior, he also sent his two sons, as guest-hostages, to seal the deal.
The basileus of Carthage at this time was Hamilcar, brother of the celebrated Hasdrubal, son of Mago. The embassy from Anaxilas must have been a welcome opportunity because he had more than one reason to fight on his behalf. Hamilcar was probably watching events unfold on Sicily very keenly. His earlier face-off with Gelon, in 491, gave him more than enough reason to keep his eyes there. He understood that with Gelon’s expansion of his borders, the inclusion of Syracuse into his empire and his alliance with Theron, the balance of power was rapidly shifting. Hamilcar knew that he had to bring the old balance of power back. With Himera now in the hands of Gelon’s chief ally, an attack on the Epikrateia was more than just a possibility, since Himera was the closest Greek city to the Punic Epikrateia. If an attack would come, it would most likely come from Himera. The Epikrateia was a crucial stop on the way to Sardinia, Carthage’s breadbasket. It was also a significant trading station for goods coming in from the Etruscans, as we’ve discussed before. Losing the Epikrateia would be disastrous for Carthage. All he needed was a reason to intervene. With Anaxilas’ embassy in the summer of 483 BC, he got just that.
Anaxilas’ embassy also added a moral dimension to the geopolitical justifications for intervening on behalf of Anaxilas. Hamilcar was Terrilos’ “xenia.” The word “xenia” can loosely be translated as “guest-friend.” A “xenia” is not just a political ally. A political alliance is purely the result of a cost-benefit analysis, but a “xenia,” on the other hand, is a friend. To aid a “xenia” is a matter of honour. Not only was an intervention now necessary to protect Punic holdings in Sicily, but it was also Hamilcar’s moral obligation.
The sources do not tell us why, but Hamilcar took three years to come to Terrilos’ aid. There are a few theories that explain this gap, none of which are mutually exclusive. One argument is that he may have been constructing his fleet of 200 warships. Another theory is that he might have sent out intelligence-gathering missions and waited for them to return to Carthage before taking any action. I suspect that Hamilcar spent those three years assembling the mercenaries that were going to fight in the coming war. He had to send embassies all over the Mediterranean and receive their responses, which takes time.
Regardless, when the mercenaries were ready, the fun began. The sources tell us that Hamilcar gathered an enormous army: Two hundred warships, three thousand transports, three hundred thousand infantrymen raised from Africa, Spain, Sardinia, Corsica and Gaul and a five-thousand strong cavalry from Numidia. The two hundred warships are probably realistic. A five-thousand strong cavalry isn’t out of the realm of possibility either. However, the three thousand transport ships and the three hundred thousand infantrymen are most certainly an exaggeration. In my estimation, these numbers were cooked up later, as part of the propaganda that victors disperse after any war. Three hundred transports and thirty thousand men seem to be more reasonable numbers, given what happens during the battle.
On the way to Sicily, a storm caught Hamilcar’s fleet because of which he lost a few of his transports. As luck would have it, those carriers carried his cavalry, and their loss would have disastrous consequences. The fleet made landfall at Panormus where he commanded his men to repair his fleet and prepare for the march to Himera. After three days, they marched, with the fleet accompanying them along the coast.
Himera lay on the northern shores of Sicily, on the banks of the river Himera, after which her founders had named her. However, she wasn’t right on the coast. There was a gap of a mile or so between the coast and the city. The city was on the western side of the river, and a wall protected her north and west. Hamilcar beached his fleet at the mouth of the river, in the north, while his land army set up camp in the west. Between the two encampments, Hamilcar set up siege works, facing the wall of the city.
Theron, and his men had already stationed themselves inside. The sources do not mention why, but Hamilcar thought it prudent to take a small number of men and attack the unwalled south side of the city. Here, he met Theron and his men, whom he readily defeated. Cowed into temporary submission, Theron’s men returned to the safety of the city and watched as the Carthaginians ravaged the outskirts of Himera. Theron desperately sent a messenger to Syracuse requesting Gelon’s assistance. Gelon promptly arrived with somewhere between thirty and fifty thousand infantrymen and about two thousand horse. Upon arriving, he found unprotected Carthaginian foragers, whom he swiftly killed or enslaved.
The attack on the foragers made Hamilcar feel the loss of his cavalry. Had his cavalry been there, the foragers could have continued foraging unmolested. To restore the deficit in his ranks, he dispatched a messenger to his allies, the Selinuntines, requesting a supply of cavalry to join the war effort. However, Gelon’s men intercepted this messenger. Knowing what was in the note, Gelon had a contingent of his cavalrymen disguise themselves as Selinuntines, and sent them over to Hamilcar’s camp. Not suspecting a thing, Hamilcar let these men join him.
Then the fighting began in earnest. Right from the get-go, the battle was a disaster for the Carthaginians. They were slaughtered mercilessly by Gelon’s men, over the course of the day. At a certain point during the battle, however, Carthage’s Iberian contingents began to push back. For a little while, it looked as though the tide may be turning. But disaster still lurked. Theron had not yet joined the battle, but when he saw the Iberians putting up a fierce fight, he and his men entered the fighting and pushed them back. At this point, the imposter Selinuntine cavalry joined them, too. This combined push all but finished the job. Not only was the army defeated, but at some point during the battle, the imposter Selinuntines had even set fire to the Punic fleet. By the day’s end, the entire Punic army was either dead or enslaved, while only a small number of the Punic fleet remained. Gelon and Theron’s men supposedly collected an enormous amount of booty that the Carthaginians left behind.
The Carthaginians that survived boarded the few remaining ships and left. However, as if to put a cherry atop the icing on the cake, they were hit by another storm. One ship and a handful of men returned to Carthage to convey the bad news.
What happened to Hamilcar? Well, three accounts inform us of his fate, one from Polyanus, another from Diodorus and the last one from Herodotus.
Polyanus relates that, during the battle, Gelon and his priests, stepped out of their encampment. Some cattle accompanied them, ready to be given up to the gods as offerings. Seeing that Gelon was about to please his gods, Hamilcar, too, stepped out of his encampment to do the same. His priests lit up a fire, ready to receive its human sacrificial victims. All of a sudden, Gelon and his priests took off their ceremonial garbs. Out came their bows and within moments, Hamilcar and his entourage were mowed down by a volley of arrows.
Diodorus relates, however, that it was the imposter Selinuntines, whom Hamilcar had retained as his bodyguards, that did him in. When he was getting ready to perform his sacrifices, they just pushed him into the fire, where he burned to death.
Lastly, Herodotus relates that Hamilcar was dismayed by the way the battle was going. So, to procure the gods’ favour, he jumped into the fire, offering himself as the sacrifice.
Not unreasonably, the Carthaginians thought that Gelon might try to press his advantage and attack Carthage directly. They prepared themselves by manning their walls. They also sent ambassadors to Syracuse. Curiously, they sought the intercession of Gelon’s wife, to whom they gifted a crown made of gold when Gelon agreed to negotiate.
Gelon gave the Carthaginians extremely light terms: Carthage was to pay a two-thousand-talents-of-silver war indemnity to Gelon, and they were to construct two shrines at the site of the battle that would house this treaty. Some sources even mention another curious condition, that Carthage was to cease the practice of human sacrifice. Though, I highly doubt that the Carthaginians stuck to their word on this.
Curiously enough, Gelon did not punish Selinus for allying with Carthage. Nor did Gelon make another attempt at pushing the Carthaginians out of Sicily, despite his hostility to them. Anaxilas made his peace with Gelon and Theron. Terrilos, however, was the ultimate loser and spent the rest of his days at Anaxilas’ court.
Quite curiously, in complete contrast to the way the Carthaginians usually dealt with their defeated generals, Hamilcar was celebrated as a hero. The Carthaginians built monuments to him throughout the Punic colonies and made annual sacrifices to his spirit. Perhaps his reputation had been spared because of Gelon’s light terms. Or maybe the idea of a selfless sacrifice on behalf of a friend appealed to the Carthaginians.
Some sources claim that as a result of Hamilcar’s defeat, the Carthaginians exiled his son, Gisco, to Selinus. To me, this does not make any sense. Why was Gisco banished and his father celebrated, when both of them had been present at the battle? Hamilcar had left three sons, the other two being Hanno & Himilco, both of whom were given naval commands a few years after Himera. Why was Gisco exiled, while his brothers were, not only not banished, but given these responsibilities? There are a few theories that try to explain this little problem. One argument is that Gisco might have attempted a coup and failed. He wasn’t put to death, as would typically be the case, because of his family’s influence, and was exiled to Selinus instead. Another theory is that Carthage exiled all three brothers. Himilco and Hanno were banished to the sea, while Carthage exiled Gisco to Selinus. A final opinion is that Gisco may have been exiled because he was present at the battle, while his brothers were not exiled because they were not present at the battle.
One problem with all of these theories is that Gisco’s son, Hannibal, not to be confused with the famous general of the Second Punic War, not only returned to Carthage but, became a basileus. How can Gisco’s son become a basileus when Gisco himself had been exiled? As for the theory that the Carthaginian Senate exiled Himilco and Hanno to the sea, the nature of their sea voyages reveals that their journeys were anything but exile. As we will discuss in the next episode, their adventures were the result of explicit commands by the Senate to explore and colonize new lands. To me, that doesn’t sound like exile. As for the theory that Gisco’s expulsion was on account of his presence at the battle, while his brothers were spared because they weren’t there, this is possible. But, then why celebrate and revere their father? What had Gisco done, that earned him exile, that Hamilcar hadn’t done, that spared his reputation?
My own two cent solution to this problem is this: Gisco was present at Himera. After the defeat, he assumed that there would be a backlash against him at Carthage. Not wanting to face any repercussions for the failure, he didn’t bother returning. Instead, he escaped to Selinus. With his brothers departing on their naval expeditions, Gisco may not have felt safe in returning even after the dust had settled. Thus, he stayed there and didn’t return until, in his mind, it was safe to do so. Once his brothers were back, though, their nephew, Hannibal, deemed it safe to return.
In the short-term, the most severe effect of the battle of Himera was Carthage’s loss of her fleet. Or at least, it could have been. The Punic Empire, which we’ll begin discussing in the next episode, was held together by this navy. No navy, no empire. Recall, however, that though the Carthaginians prepared to defend Carthage from a possible attack by Gelon, Gelon didn’t press his advantage, even though he could have. The most likely reason is that Gelon knew, or at least, he thought, that either Carthage was in possession of more ships, or could acquire a fleet within a short amount of time. If Carthage had lost all of her vessels, then to reproduce a new fleet would take at least two years. How was it, then, that Carthage could rapidly acquire a fleet? I suspect one of two things: Either Carthage’s allies would come to her aid. Or Carthage’s allies stored Carthage’s navy in their ports. In any case, Carthage could call upon these at a moment’s notice.
In the long run, too, Gelon didn’t attempt expelling the Carthaginians from Sicily, though he certainly had plenty of reasons to do so. There are no recorded battles between the Greeks and the Carthaginians between 480 and 410. If there were any conflicts, they probably amounted to nothing more than a few frontier skirmishes. Part of this may be because Gelon’s allies might not have had the confidence to pursue an anti-Punic policy. Thus far, Carthage, and the Phoenicians before them had won every conflict. The defeat at Himera, though monumental, was the only feather in the Greek cap. The string of earlier Punic victories, combined with the perception that Carthage could give the Greeks a run for their money at sea, meant that there was no appetite among the Greeks for another engagement, no matter how badly Gelon wanted it.
Despite Carthage’s naval wherewithal, one of the most prescient effects of the Battle of Himera was Carthage’s complete indifference to Sicilian affairs for the next three generations. In the 460s and 450s, Ducetius the Sicel was able to unite the indigenous tribes and gave the Greek cities of Acragas and Syracuse a run for their money. Eventually, though, he was brought down by their combined effort. Carthage could have intervened on Ducetius’ side, but she didn’t. A little while after that, Syracuse and Acragas themselves began to quarrel. Still, the Carthaginians did nothing to exploit this rift between the two former allies. Syracuse’s attacks against Etruria and Corsica also failed to awaken the Carthaginians. In the 430s, various Greek and Sicel cities wanted to overthrow Syracuse’s hegemony, to which end they sought Carthaginian aid. But still, Carthage did not budge.
There were military reasons for this isolation. Carthage may have been the queen of the sea. But the defeat at Himera demonstrated that Carthage’s mercenaries were no match for Greece’s heavily armed cavalry and their formidable infantry, the hoplites. Out of all the Greeks, it was the Spartans, i.e., the Greeks of Doric stock, the same as that of the Syracusans, that shone the most brightly. The Battle of Platea that the Greeks fought against the Persians, without which the ever-celebrated Battle of Salamis would have been in vain, had demonstrated this Doric strength. None of this would have been lost on the Carthaginians.
The most interesting effect of the war, however, was the development of the trope of the “Punic Menace.”
In 481 BC, Xerxes prepared to invade Greece. To stop Xerxes, the Greeks on the mainland needed to pool all their resources together. In the same year, they sent embassies all over the Mediterranean to seek allies. When they came to Gelon, he made no secret of his contempt for them. He spurned them just like they had done ten years earlier when he had sought their aid. He made them an offer he knew they would refuse. His message was that if they wanted his help, then they ought make him the supreme commander of the combined Greek forces. Needless to say, the mainlanders couldn’t stomach this.
His contempt for his mainland kin is also apparent from what he did during the Battle of Salamis. During the Battle, Gelon tasked one of his officers to load a boat with gold and take it to Salamis, where he was to witness the battle. If Xerxes won, then he was to offer the cash to him as a tribute. If Xerxes lost, he was to return to Syracuse.
The Greek encounters with the Persians at Salamis and Plataea ensconced in the Hellenistic psyche, perhaps for the first time, a sense of, well, Hellenism. The idea that the Greeks were a distinct nation, defined by their language, began to gain currency. Gelon missed out on this nation-defining moment by not participating in the war with the Persians. If he wanted himself to be taken seriously by the rest of Hellas, he was going to have to explain his absence at Salamis and Plataea. Thus, he began the “Punic Menace” propaganda.
He had monuments constructed at Delphi, the place where all Greeks went to seek premonition of how their wars were going to end, and at Olympia, the famous mountain that was the home of the Greek gods, to celebrate the victory at Himera. He commissioned poets to sing in his and Theron’s names. His family, the Deinomenid clan, continued this campaign even after his death. In all these efforts, Carthage is a monster; a barbarian city hell-bent on destroying Greece. Instead of now being a traitor to the cause, Gelon was hailed as a hero for protecting Western Hellas from Carthage, while the rest of Greece protected Eastern Hellas, which was under fire from the Achaemenid Persians. The result of all this was the recasting of these two civilizations as monsters in the Hellenistic imagination.
These efforts gave rise to the myth persistent in the sources that Carthage had allied herself with Persia. They were in league with each other for the sole purpose of destroying Greece. Since the Carthaginians were Phoenicians and the Phoenicians provided Xerxes with his navy, in the propagandists’ minds, the Carthaginians were officially in league with the Persians. This perception also gave rise to the myth that the Battle of Himera occurred on the same day as, in one account, the Battle of Thermopylae, where Leonidas fell, and in another account, the Battle of Salamis. Herodotus and Aristotle, sensing that this was a nasty, stinky pile of dung, claim that while the coincidence of the battles is true, this coincidence is exactly that: a coincidence. However, while there is no evidence for an official alliance between Persia and Carthage, it is possible that the Tyrian sailors involved in the war may have leaked Persian intelligence on to Carthage. The Tyrians, knowing that there would be naval battles, wanted to make sure that Greek naval defenses be divided. Alternatively, as alluded to earlier, Hamilcar’s three-year wait before he sent his forces to Himera could have been due to an intelligence-gathering mission. Perhaps he was trying to align his attack with the Persian one. Who knows? Maybe Hamilcar did send an embassy to Persia.
In the long run, however, the propaganda was a dismal failure. For a time, the image of Carthage as a city of barbarians was held up in Greek literature, and the myth of the Persian-Punic alliance became quite pervasive. However, as I just mentioned, Herodotus and Aristotle gave no credence to that myth. Aristotle, in fact, actually had much good to say about Carthage, praising them for their political stability. Plato, too, found Carthage to be quite appealing, praising them for their various laws controlling alcohol consumption and inebriated behavior. On Sicily, also, there was little change. Religious activity continued undisrupted. Politically, Greek and local cities still sought political alliances with Carthage against other cities. For about a generation, trade between Athens & Carthage was ample, too. Most significantly, the Athenians, at one point, even sought Carthaginian assistance against Syracuse.
That this was propaganda is evident from another angle, too. We know that, in general, early Carthaginian history is quite spotty and remains so until about 410 BC. We also know that the Greeks and Carthaginians had engaged in several battles before the Battle of Himera, but details are lacking for all of these engagements. How is it, then, that we have quite a detailed account of this one battle? Not only that, we have, not one, but three different reports of Hamilcar’s death, while the ends of other Carthaginian leaders are hardly ever mentioned. I think that the details of this battle, no matter how unreliable, would have been lost had it not been for Gelon’s propaganda.
And so I’ll end with an inescapable corollary of that thought: How much of this set of accounts actually true?
Carthage locked herself out of Sicily for the next seventy years. What she did during this interregnum will be the subject of the upcoming two episodes. We will examine Carthage’s consolidation of the Western Mediterranean metals trade. We will also take a look at the empire that Carthage had begun building way back in the sixth century, and how that dovetailed with her control of the metals trade in the fifth.
If you have any comments, questions or concerns, please email me at firstname.lastname@example.org. You can visit the Historyteller blog at historytellerpodcast.com and can listen to the podcast on iTunes and Google Play. You can also find me on the usual social media site. I am on Twitter, Facebook, Pinterest, Linked In and Google Plus. You can find these links on the right-hand side of the historytellerpodcast.com website. If you liked this episode, please leave me a five-star review on iTunes. If you loved it, please help spread the word about it on your social media.
Alright, folks, that’s it for now!
- Warmington, B. H. Carthage. London: Roberta Hale & Company, 1969 (Buy from Amazon, also here & here)
- Miles, Richard. Carthage Must Be Destroyed. London: Penguin Books, 2010 (Buy from Amazon, Buy audiobook from Audible)
- Picard, Gilbert-Charles and Collette Picard. The Life and Death of Carthage. Translated by Dominique Collon. New York: Taplinger Publishing Company, 1968 (Buy from Amazon, also here)
- Lancel, Serge. Carthage: A History. Translated by Antonia Nevill. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Limited, 1995 (Buy from Amazon)
- Hoyos, Dexter. The Carthaginians. Oxford: Routledge, 2010 (Buy from Amazon)